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This paper uses a game-theoretic model of the tax compliance game to estimate a model of
audit selection and income tax underrPnnrt;n
_r__....g in Jamaica. The empirical analysis makes use of
audited tax returns for individual taxpayers, and a random sample of tax returns for the
population from which the audited returns are selected. The estimation results strongly indicate
a nonrandom audit strategy, and thus provide support for the game-theoretic approach. The
results also indicate that the probability of underreporting and the level of underreporting are
positively related to the marginal tax rate and to income, and negatively related to marginal
payroll tax benefits; in general, the underreporting elasticities are small.

1. Introduction

Perhaps the most common of all econon;ic crimes is tax evasion, and the
analysis of tax compliance has grown enormously in the East two decades.’
owever, this analysis has only recently begun to recognize a central - and
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obvious - feature of the compliance process that is present in the tax systems
of most countries: the government agency does not select tax returns
randomly for audit but instead uses information from the ret
determine strategically whom to audit. While theoretical analysis h
to incorporate
the interactive aspects of the tax compliance game
[Reinganum and Wilde (1985, 1986), Graetz et al. (1986), Erard an
Feinstein (1992) Cronshaw and Alm (1993-J ern~~~ic~~uork that appks this
framework has been limited. ~r~rn~r~~yby the absence of information on
individual compliance choices. Dubin and Wilde (1988), Dubin et al. (199(I),
and Beron et al. (1992) have estimated models in which individual and
agency interactions are considcrcd, but they are forced to use aggregate data
supplied by the United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS).’
The use of aggregate data has several troubling and unavoidable implications. Most obviously, it has not generally been possible to estimate the
specific factors (if any) that determine the selection on an individual tax
return for audit.” Of perhaps more importance, it has not been possible to
estimate the individual responses to changes in variables like income and
marginal tax rates in a framework that accurately captures the interactive tax
system that individuals actually face. Given the fundamentally covert nature
of compliance, overcoming these problems is a formidable task.
There are, however, sources of information from countries other than the
United States, sources that have not been fully utilized in the analysis cf t?w
compliance. In particular, data from developing countries has seldom been
used in compliance research.4 The purpose of this paper is to use data from
Jamaica to estimate the determinants of individual audit selection and
individual tax evasion behavior in a way that treats the tax agency and the
taxpayer as strategic players in the compliance game.
This estimation is made possible by the existence of two unique microlevel
data sets for Jamaican taxpayers, generated as part of a comprehensive tax
“Dubin et al. (1990) use information on reported tax liabilities by state from the IRS. Dubin
and Wilde (1988) and Beron et al. (1992) use data from the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement
Program (TCMP) of the IRS. The TCMP consists of detailed line-by-line audits of a stratified
random sar-qle of roughly fifty thousand individual income tax returns conducted on a threeyear cycle, so that each return has information on the income and tax liabilities reported by the
taxpayer and an IRS estimate of the ‘true’ income and tax liability. Until recently the IRS has
made these data available to researchers only in aggregate (or three-digit zip code level) form
and only for the year 1969. There is now some work that uses more recent individual data
[ Feinstein ( 199 I ), Erard ( 1992)].
3Note , however . that Dubin and Wilde (19881, Dubin et al. (199? and Beron et al. (1992) are
able to test for the endogeneity of audit rates in their aggregate data and so are able to test for
the presence of an endogenous agency. They generally find that the audit rate is endogenous,
which is consistent with an agency that forms an enforcement strategy based on information
provided by the taxpayer. Also. Erard (1992) allows for the endogeneity of audit selection.
ird (1992) for a discussion ol’ tax compliance and administration
in developing
Countries.

oveinment of Jai,~ai~a.~
eiived

estimates
of ~ndjQjd~a~

factors that determine both the seiection of an individual tax return for a&it
and the amount of underreporting on that return. They therefore allow an
empirical test of tax compliance as a sequential move game between the tax
agency and the taxpayer. They also allow consistent estimation of the
behavioral responses of individuals to policy innovations,
A three-stage estimation procedure is used, which applies the Heckman
(1979) self-selectivity process and which allows for strategic behavior by
taxpayers and by the Jamaica Income Tax Department (ITDj.6 In the
initial two stages, bivariate probit analysis is applied to the pooled data sets
to estimate the factors that determine the ITD’s selection of returns that are
to be audited and the factors that determine the bikelihood of noncompliance. Factors that determine the first-stage audit selection include items
that the taxpayer reports on the return, as well as information capturing the
resource capacity of the ITD. The lirst component of the bivariate probit
analysis controls for and identifies the audit selection criterion; this first-stage
estimation therefore makes explicit the systematic selection of tax returns by
the audit agency. The second component of the bivariate prohit analysis is
applied only to the audited returns, in order to analyze the factors that
determine whether or not the inoividual is noncompliant in terms of
underreported taxes or underrepor+:d income; these factors in the secondstage probit estimation include income, the marginal tax rate, the benefits to
which payroll contributions entitle the taxpayer, and various socioeconomic
variables. In the third stage, linear regressions are estimated using both the
level of income and the level of tax underreporting as dependent variables.
Explanatory variables include those from the second component ol’ the
bivariate probit estimation, as well as selectivity bias control5 derived from
both stages of the bivariate probit model in order to control for nonrandom
selectiozn. The three-stage procedure therefore allows estimation of the major
factors that determine individual compliance behavior in a way that recognizes the possible endogeneity of ITD behavior. The results also provide
Tax Structure Examination Project. For a
‘The tax reform project was called the Jarnab
discussion of the project, see Bahl (1991) and Gillis (1989); Gillis (1989) also discusses other
recent tax reforms.
‘Note also that several alternative estimation methods are used in order to examine the
robustness of the results. These alternative methods are discussed in more detail later.

evidence on the empirical relevance of the sequential equi
the tax compliance game.
The empirical results provi
theoretic approach to tax c
the systematic nature of the
of reported items that influ
third-stage results demonstrate that e~~~orn~~
individual’s compliance
~~~lderreporting are posit
and negatively related to marginal payroD tax
poilses are often small4 (ex
variables also affect noncompiiance. The impact of a recent m
the Jamaican income tax i
Section 2 discusses th
Section 3 specifies the models of tax evasion that are estimated, as we44as the
data and estimation “cchniques that are e~~~4~yed. The estimation results
and the simirlation of tax reform are presented in section 4. Summary and
conciusions are provided in section 5.
Jamaica individual income tax
The individual income tax in Jamaica is similar to that in many other
countries, and, like the cx43erience of countries elsewhere, the tax is a
productive - and _npopular - source of government revenue. Dissatisfaction
witn the income tax, as welt as with other components of the tax system, led
the Government of Jamaica to institute a comprehensive reform of the entire
Jamaican tax systen in early 1986. Reform. mzmt the replace
existing tax with a sim@er, f4at-rate tax on an expanded definition of income.
The data in this paper are based on the tax system as it existed from 1980
through 4982, and were obtained with the cooperation of the Government of
Jamaica as part of the tax reform project. The discussion of the income tax is
based upon the previous, not the reformed, system.
Revenues from the individual income tax (in Jamaican dollars) were
J$442.4 million in fiscal year 4983184, or 28.8 percent of total government
revenues.’ Nearly al4 of these revenues (over 93 percent) wetc derived by
employer wit hholdin g of employee taxes on wages and salaries under the
Pay-As-You-Earn (PAW) system. In principle, the PAYE system is designed
so that at year’s end taxes withheld by the employer will exactly equal the
taxpayer’s true tax liability. If a discrepancy does result, the wage earner is
required to file a tax return to correct the (positive or negative) difference.
n ~~dividua4 with income from other sources (such as rent, interest,
‘At that time the exchange rate between Jamaican an

U.S. dollars v~as 3.94.

“The empkyer’s paytoii must ex
amounts paid to HEART trahees (.I

$7,222

per monh;

the tax bill is reduced by the
government agencies are

for a fulLtime trainee); ad

exempt.

‘Only csntral go\erament employees in pensionable offices are eligible to participate.
‘Human Employment and R.SOUFCX Training (HEART); National Housing Trust
National insurance Scheme (NIS): and Civil Service Family Benefits Scheme (CSFBS).
%A: Not applicable.

(NH%;

dividends, or self-empfoymnnt) musi aIso file a return on which taxes on
these sources oi’ income are paid. This second group is calied the
self-employed.
The rate structure of the mcome tax prior to the reform was both hi
and steeply progressive (see tab1 ). The marginal tax rates rose
from 30 percent on the first 5$7,
of statutory into
These rates were applicable to be
income above J$I 4,
un
c:n
individual’s
employed workers.
could be reduced to zero
from personal and childr
medical expenses. These c
of revenues actually col
The inzome tax is

Two

of these trjl

yme~t. The first is the

and R--=-‘Trainlrqj (HEART) Trust Fund, which is a training and
tid”ULUvI.,
en@oyment program financed by taxes on private-sector firms with monthly
wage payments rn excess of J$7,222.
~~rn~ned in their entirety, these payroll pro rams constitute a significant
additional burden on Jamaican taxpayers [see kn!e 1). Tora! revenues from
all payroll programs are substantial, amouniing to roughly 50 percent of
revenues from the income tax.
The income and payroN tax systems in combination therefore created a
lsrge incentive to underrepcrt income or taxes. The marginal tax rate facsd
by some laxpayers could reach nearly 30 percent, and was never less than
35.5 percent. owever it is important to note that the payroll tax programs
have potentia
otfseltting effects on the incentive to evade. On the one hand,
they increase th=: cost of Lempliance because they increase t e tax burden on
reported earnings. On the other hand, some af the payroll programs genezate
benefits that increse with the amount of reported income and contributions;
e benefits stem from the housing, insurance, and pension features of the
, CSFBS, and NIS. The benefits to which reported income entitles the
contributor have typically been ignored in theorebcal and empirical work on
tax c24mpliancc. An important feature of the specification of both the
theoretical and r he empirical models is the recognition that these benefits in
fact exist and alter the incentive to evade income.

a

s.

etho

ogy:

3. i. ~~lt~~~~t~~ii,~~
s~t~t~~~~~~lii~tr

‘Tk theoretical model of audit agency and tax ayer interaction is ased
actual income reporting and filing pro s for those who file tax
of moves is

underreporting

income, then he or she must pay a fine on evaded income

Y(1 - t +b) - E(ft - t +b), while the income if he or she is not caught with
probability (l-p) is Y,=D+E--tD+bD=
Y(P-t+b)+E{t-b),
where D+
E= Y. The parameters t, 6, and j‘are assumed for the moment to be fixed for
the individual.’ Recall that the prc,bability p depends in part upon the items
reported by the taxpayer.
The taxpayer is assumed to choose E so as to maximize an expected utility
function &U(Y) that depends upon income in the two states of the world, or
8I.J Y) = pU( Y,) t ( 1 - p)U( Y,). where A is the expectation operator. The
first-order condition for an interior solution requires that the expected
marginal utilities of income in the two states of the world, weighted by the
tax, benefit, and penalty rates in the respective states, must Le equated; given
concavity of the utility function, the second-order condition is satisfied.” It
is easy to demonstrate that an (exogenous) increase in the probability of
“See Reinganum and Wilde (1986) for a detailed discussion of thl, sequential move game, as
weli as an anaiysis of its WLUK;II~:S.Erard and Feinsitk (1992) extend this model to atlow both
for a budget-constrained tax agency and for the exister.ce of taxpayers who always report their
true income.
‘Note that taxes and benefits are assumed to be imposed and accrued at the constant rates t
as is rhe case for
and h. This is done primanly for convenience. In the Jamaican tax system
these are more accurately seen as tax and benefit functions. The empirical
most countries
sprcifkation of the model fully reflects the ract that t and h are imposed at nonlinear r&es.
‘OThe first-order condition can be rearrangelf to give

pU’( Y&f6 - I f h] = (1 - p)U’( Ys)[r - h].
and the second-order

condition

pU”( YC)[ff --t +I?]‘+(

is
1 - p)U ‘(&![t -t$<O.

ate that p is assumed to be a constant

in arriving at these conditions. since the taxpayer ha%

no k~~w~edg~ of the actual audit selection rule.

detection

and an increase in the fine on evaded income will decrease evaded
income; however, the effects of changes in the tax rate, the benefit rate, an
income are ambiguous and depend upon the individual’s attitude towards
risk.’ ’
e E can be
This framework suggests that the demand for evaded i
written as a function of income, the (corn ined) immne and payroll tax rate,
the benefit rate, the fine rate, and the probability of detection:

Remember, however, that the probability of detection is not a fixed
parameter but instead depends in part on items reported by the individual
on the tax return.
Note that an alternative specification of the individual’s choice problem,
attributable to Christiansen (1980), views the individual as selecting the
amount of evaded taxes, rather than the amount of evaded income. In terms
of the above model, the individua! now chooses G, where G= tE. This
alternative specification suggests that there is a demand for evaded taxes

G=W,t,b,f,ph

(1’)

in which the determinants are the same as for evaded taxes.
Consider next the behavior of the revenue agency. Following Reinganum
and Wilde (1986) and Erard and Feinstein (1992), the tax agency is assumed
to select an enforcement strategy in order to maximize expected tax : &Id
penalty revenues net of audit costs and subject to a limited audit budget.12
Based on the items reported by the taxpayers on their tax returns and the
agency’s conjectures about the impact of the reported items on the expected
tax dollars to be collected in any audit, the agency establishes an audit
selection rule. Et is assumed that this selection rule can be represented by an
index of expected audit productivity (inclusive of penalties and net of audit
costs) for each individual i, which depends upon the taxpayer’s return
declarations and the available auditing budget. The linearized version of this
index can be expressed as

where Zg is the measure of expected audit productivity, the vector r consists
“See Allingham and 5andmo (l~72) for the initial theoreticai analysis of the taxpayer choices.
Cowell (1990) surveys the subsequent theoretical literature.
“The net revenue assumption on agency behavior i\ not essential to the empirical analysis,
and there are other assumptions that could easily be made. For example, Slemrod and Yitzhaki
(1987) argue that the agency might choose an enforcement strategy to maximize a social welfare
function. As long as the agency selects returns for audit on the basis o! reported return
information, the empirical specification Is not affected.

of assessment weights that are a Eied to some su set of the indivi
reported return items as contain
7 is the coc~cie~t on audit
resources R. The error term c is
e normally distributed, and is
necessary because the tax agency
determine audit ~r~duct~~;~ty
perfecily.
sed upon the values of 12 across all taxpa
, a determination
is then
as to whether or not to audit individual 0’.
udit selection rule can
be expressed in probabilistic terms as

where p represents the probability of audit (with 05;~s 1) as some function
of the subset of return information declared by individual i, the assessment
weights, and the auditing resources. In general, the taxpayer is unaware of
the specific way in which his return is selected; that is, the taxpayer has no
specific knowledge of the intensity of agency audit efforts (I?), the return
items that trigger an audit (Z), and the way in which agency efforts and
return items trigger an audit (*; and I). The tax agency is, however, well
aware of the decisions of the taxpayers as reported on the tax returns, and
optimally chooses its policies given these prior actions.
Eqs. (1) Cor (l’)], V), and (3) constitute a game-theoretic, sequential
equilibrium mcbdel of the tax compliance game. The individual first decides
how much income to report (or how much tax to pay), knowing that the
items reported on the return may affect the probability of audit. The tax
agency then selects the returns to be audited, using the information provided
by the tax return. The outcome of this game is a compliance strategy for the
individual, as well as an audit strategy for the agency. In equilibrium, these
strategies must be a best response strategy for each player. Procedures for
estimating this model are discussed next.
3.2. Empiricai spec$ication
There are several ways to estimate the theoretical framework presented
above. One approach is suggested by the empirical work of Erard (1992)
and draws on the extensive literature on estimation of odels with selfselectivity. This approach gives rise to a three-equation empirical ode1 that
may be referred to as a sequential model stiith muhiple criteria for
selectivity. l3 In the first stage, the audit selection u)c of the tax agency is
estimated. In the second stage, the probability of in
~~com~~ja~c~ is
estimated for those individuals who are selected for
the level of compliance is estimated for those in
13See Maddala (1983) for a detailed discussion of this literature

selected for audit and who choose to cheat. There are, of course, alternative
estimation approaches. These methods are discussed at various points below.
The first equation in the self-selectivity model is the audit selection process.
Contingent upon the specific selection rule, the individual return characteristics, and audit resources, a return is chosen from the ~o~~~atio~ for audit if
12 >O. The stochastic version of the linearized audit selection rule is simply
eq. (3), and is rewritten here for convenience:
(4)
Although the index 1: is itself unobservable, the audit (p= 1) and nonaudit
(p =0) cases are observed, which gives rise to the indicator variable
I, =

Eq. (5) can be estimated by probit analysis.
The second-stage estimation pertains to the identification of the noncompliant, conditional upon an audit. The (detected) noncompliant individuals
correspond to that subset of audited individuals for whom the expected
benefits of noncompliance exceed the expected costs. Measuring the expected
benefits and costs of noncompliance by the index Z;t;,the stochastic index of
the net benefits of noncompliance can be written as
1; =xp+a,

(6)

where the vector of coefftcients /? measures the impact of taxpayer characteristics X and u) is the error term. Like IX, f;t; is unobservable, although it is
possible 10 identify the compliant and the noncompliant who have been
subjected to audit. This gives rise to a second indicator variable
IN =

1 iff Iz,IE>O,
0 otherwise,

;7)

which. like eq. (5), can be estimated by probit analysis.
In the final stage, the level of noncompliance L (underreported income or
underreported taxes) is observed iff 12 >O and 88 >O; that is, two selection
hurdles must be overcome before a nonzero level of noncompliance is

is a

vec%or c f toe

j4 1s the error term.

and where Q( *) is the bivariate normal distrib tion function with correlation
p, @( *) is the univariate normal distribution function, and @(s) is the
univariate normal density function.
The result in eq. (9) motivates a straightforward extension of the selectivity
process discussed by Heckman (1979). The application here is in the spirit of
the double hurdle model introduced by Cragg (1971) and generafized by
Catsiapis and Robinson ( 1982) and Blundell and Meghir (1987); see also Lee
and Maddala (1985). In the combined first and second stages, consistent
estimates of P, 7 and B are obtained by maximum likelihood bivariate
estimation of eqs. (5) and (7), which in turn allows construction of con
estimates for the terms in eq. (9). In the third and final stage, linear
regression is applied to eq. (8), with the two constructed variables from the
bivariate probit model used to control for double selection as implied in eq.
(9). As with the standard Heckman (1979) model, the final stage is potentially
heteroscedastic.
It should be noted that there are other methods of estimation.
example, it is possible to use univariate probit analysis to estimate the first
and second stages separately, under the assumption that the error terms of
the two probit equations are independent [Le., cov (E,CII)
=O]. Als
second and third stages could be viewed in co bined form as a single
process, and can be estimated with and with
the selectivity control
the first-stage probit estimation. Another, and perhaps more intuitive,
approach is to use
audited return a pr
probability as an

extensive econometric basis for the three-stage selection model, the selection
approach is emphasized here, despite its potential limitations.” Nevertheless.
the results from the alternative methods are also presented below (see
footnotes 26 and 27). In general, the estimation results are quite ro
across the different specifications.

3.3. Datu and variable construction
Two data se:s are utilized in the empiricai analysis. The first consists of

148 audited tax returns for self-employed Jamaican taxpayers. This ‘audit
data set’ represents virtually the entire population of self-employed returns
subjected to intense audit by the IT’D for the three-year period from 1980 to
1982, with 67 returns from 1980, 56 from 1981, and the remaining 25 from
1982.’ ’ All returns were chosen for line-.by-line audit by the ITD on the
basis of some undisclosed selection criteria. Not all of those returns audited
were found to indicate noncompliance. Of the 148 returns audited, 101 were
found to contain understatements of income and 110 were found to contain
tax understatements.”
Since each tax return in the audit data set was subjected to line-by-line
audit by ITD personnel, there is information on both reported and postaudit, or ‘true’, return items. In particular, reported and true information is
provided on the type and level of income earned (wage income, income from
trade or business, rental income, and dividend income). This inC2rmation

14These potential limitations are of several types. For example, suppose that the error term in
the second-stage eauation is large and positive, which implies a high level of evasion and
therefore a low level of reported taxes (or reported income). If the error terms in the first- and
second-stages are atso correlated, then the error term in the first-stage audit equation may be
correlated with reported taxes (or reported income). In a nonlinear model. the remedy for this
specification problem is not straightforward. Also, the effects of the audit probabi!Ity on the
second- and third-stage compliance equations are not explictly considered in the seleciion model
(although it should be noted that these effects are directly estimated in several of the alternative
models); again. there is no obvious solution in a nonlinear model. Finally, the selection model is
estimated with limited. not full. information methods. Limited information methods are used
because full information maximum likelihood (FIML) techniques are computationally
burdensome; as noted by Erard (1992). it is especially difficult to estimate the cross-equation
correlations. The use of FIML would also provide only efficiency gains reiative to the limited
information maximum likelihood methods used here. Despite these potential limitations, it is
important to note that, as discussed later, the empirical results are similar across the various
estimation methods.
‘sA small number of returns that were audited could not be located by ITD personnel. All
available returns are included in the current analysis.
“Not all income underreporters
were found to have understated their tax liability. Some
taxpayers reported negative values of statutory income that were revised upward, but still
remained nega“.e. after audit. There were also those who correctly revealed their statutory
incomebut misstated their tax liability either by calculating an incorrect tax liability (based on
correct income) or by making inappropriate use of tax credits.

allows the construction of one measure of ~o~c~m~i~ance: u
income. The data al
etailed ~nf~rmatjon on individual tax credits,
and the reported an
~~co~~e tax lia ility far each taxpayer. The
tax liability information allows the constructi n of a second measure of
noncompliance: underreported taxes. ’ ’
In table 2, descriptive statistics are presented far those audited.
le the
average amounts of income and taxes underreported are JSS,$94 an
2,799,
respectively, the averages mask considerable variation in noncompliance
across income tax brackets. For example, 35 percent of those audited earn
less than J$7,000 in (post-audit) income and fall into the lowest tax bracket.
For these taxpayers, the average amounts of income and taxes understate
are J$1,690 and J%375, respectMy. Far the 28 percent in the top marginal
tax bracket, average underreported income amounts to J$l4,413 and average
underreported taxes equal 5$8$X9.
The second data set (the ‘self-employed sample’) is a 932 observation
stratified random sample of nonaudited tax returns for self-employed
Jamaican taxpayers for tax year 1980, which provides detailed information
on the population from which the audited returns are selected. The audit and
the self-employed data sets are similar in that both contain the full range of
reported tax return information for the self-employed; they differ in that only
the audit data contain pest-audit return information. Table 3 provides
summary statistics and variable definitions for the self-employed sample.
Three-stage estimation techniques are applied to these two data sets, as
suggested by the self-selectivity model above. The first and second stages are
estjmated jointly using weighted bivariate probit analysis. In the first
component of the bivariate probit model the ITD’s audit selection rule [eq.
(S)] is identified by combining the audit data with the self-employed data.
The dependent variable is whether or not a return is selected for audit. Since
the audit data comprise all audits covering the 1980 to 1982 period, the selfemployed sample is weighted through the use of a replication factor SO that
“It is important to recognize that the audit information has some of the same weaknesses
identilied by Clotfelter (1983) for the TCMP survey. First, it is unlikely that the ITD auditors
have detected all forms of unreported income and overclaimed tax credits: even the ITD
personnel acknowledge the difficulties they face with a shrinking and undertrained staff. Second,
the audit sample relates only to those who file tax returns and provides no information on
taxpayers who do not tile returns. There is some evidence in Jamaica that nonfilers are
responsible for a greater amount of evasion than filers [Aim et al. (199111. Third, the
interpretation of the two measures of tax evasion is not entirely straightforward. An individual
may underreport income (or underpay taxes) because of simple mistakes, because of what are
incorrectly viewed as legal exciusions or tax credits, or because of fraud. The first two cases are
‘honest’ mistakes; only the third should be considered true evasion. However, it is not possible
to determine the actual reason for underreporting
by simply looking at the tax return
information for each taxpayer. Instead, all underreporting
is identified here as tax evasion:
therefore, the measure of evasion used in the empirical analysis may over- or understate true
evasion.
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Table 2
Variable definitions and descriptive statistics for audit da?a (dollar amvunts in amaican dollars).
_.

Continuous

variables

___Mean

Variable

Definition

UNDERlNC

Ku,894
Underreported income, equal to
post-audit income minus reported
income
Underreported taxes, equal to post2,799
audit taxes minus reported taxes
0.433
Effective marginai income and
payroll tax rate
8,447
Post-audit net of tax income
0.027
Marginal payroll tax benefits
3.23
Family size as imputed from tax
credit usage
1,620
Taxes as reported by taxpayer
4,384
Correct tax liability after audit
7,i35
Income as reported by taxpayer
12,585
Correct income after audit

UNDERTAX
MTR
INC
BENEFIT
FAMSIZE
RTAX
POST-AUDIT

TAXES

RING
POST-AUDITINCOME

3$75,235

43.257
0.615
41.278
10
32,383
47,730
63,552

0.0
0.0

- 13,005
0.009
I
0.0
0.0
-27,3i3
- 13,005

Discrete variables
Variable

Definition

RL’lVDlJM

Reported dividend income dummy
Reported wage income dummy
Reported self-employment income
and capital allowance dummy
Post-audit dividend income dummy
Post-audit wage income dummy
Post-audit self-employment income and
capital allowance dummy
Income underreporters
Tax underreporters

RWAGDU M
RCAPDUM
DIVDUM
WAGDUM
CAPDVM

INCNON
TAXNON

Frequency

Percent

7
6
68

4.7
10.8
45.9

7
73

4.7
10.1
49.3

101
110

68.2
74.3
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the combined data reflect the population of self-employed filers for this
period. l8
The specification of the first component or stage of the biv
model relies largely upon taxpayer return characteristics that seem likely to
influence the ITD’s index of audit productivity. One variable is t
reported tax liability (RTAX); alternatively, reported income (RING) is

“The audit data have been pooled across years because of the small number of observations
per year. Regressions confined to individual years exhibit a sign pattern simi!ar to the results
reported, although there are tendencies for insignificant coeffkients. These results imply stability
in audit selection criteria across years.

J. Ah

e1 al.. Antdir selection

and income fax urtderreporrhg

1.5

Table 3
Variable definitions and descriptive statistics for self-employed data (dollar amounts in Jamaican
dollars).
Continuous
Variable

variables

Definition

_____.--

-Income as reported by taxpayer Taxes as reported by taxpayer

RINC
RTAX

Mean

Maximum

~__
Minimum

J$7.932
1,466

JS372.962
72,490

J$- 162,148
0.0

Discrete variables
Variable

kmition

RDIVDUM

Reported
Reported
Reported
allowance

RWAGDUM
RCAPDU M

dividend income dummy
wage income dummy
self-employment incorn;: and capita:
dummy

Frequency

_Percent

216
212
280

23.2
22.7
30.0

addition, two dummy variables are used to indicate the reported
income source, including dividends (RDfVDUM)and wages subject to source
wi’.hholding (RWAGDUM); also included is a dummy variable to reflect
ircome or adjustments to income from self-employment (RCMDUM). Since
the audit selection criteria is unknown, it is difficult to speculate on the
hypothesized signs for these variables. Other individual-specific factors, such
as payroll tax benefits and the marginal tax rate, are not included in the first
stage because it seems unlikely that ITD officials focus on these variables
when selecting returns for audit. Finally, a variable is included to reflect the
budget constraint and coverage capacity of the ITD auditing division in
identifying the noncompliant, specified as the ratio of the ITD’s budget to
the population for 1980, 1981, and 1982 (ITDRES).” Note that ITDRES is
unknown to the taxpayer.
It is important to emphasize that this component of the bivariate probit
estimation allows a direct test of systematic audit agency behavior. If the
taxpayer in tact faces a predetermined probability of audit, then information
reported on the tax return should have no impact on the likelihood of an
audit, and the explanatory variables should not be stat%tically significant.
However, if the agency systematically selects returns for audit on the basis of
reported information, then some or all of the explanatory variables should be
significant. Significance would imply that the provability of audit is not fixed
for the individual.
The second component or stage of the bivariate probit equation focuses on
factors influencing the probability of tax aydr noncompliance, and
stage linear regression examines determi ants of the level of none
klu&J.

In

“The mean value of 1TDRES is 31.4, and reflects a substantial
for 1982 relative to previous years.

increase in the ITD’s budget
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Due to the similarity of these behavioral processes, the explanatory variables
used in the final two stages are the same, with the exception of the two
selectivity terins in the third stage.
Two alternative indicators of noncompliance are used to estimate the
individual’s behavioral response in the second part of the bivariate probit
model [eq. (7)]. The first measure indicates income noncompliance
(ZNCNON) and the second indicates tax noncompliance (TAXNON). These
variables equal 1 if noncompliance is present and detected and 0 otherwise.
Two corresponding measures of noncompliance are also used as dependent
variables in examining the level of noncompliance in the third stage, for
those identified as noncompliant [eq. (S)]: the log of the difference between
the taxpayer’s reported income and the post-audit level of income (UNDERZNC), and the log of the difference between the taxpayer’s reported tax
liability and the post-audit tax iiability (UNDERTAX).*’
All explanatory variables in the second- and third-stage estimations are
based upon true, or post-audit, information. The first variable is income
(ZNC), specified as post-audit, net-of-tax income. Calculation of INC using
post-audit income and taxes ensures its exogeneity, since post-audit variables
can be considered independent of the taxpayer’s decisions.
The m:arginal tax rate (MTR) is specified to include both income and
payroll tax rates. In addition, the use of income tax credits is taken into
account in calculating the effective marginal tax rate. To the extent that a
taxpayer has credits that can be applied to the income tax liability, the
accrual and taxation of an additional dollar of income may not generate any
additional income tax liability, and as a result the effective marginal income
tax rate may be zero. Nonetheless, a positive payroll tax liability is likely to
occur since tax credits cannot be applied to payroll tax obligations; as such,
the payroll tax component of MTR will in general be positive. Post-audit
income is used to determine the taxpayer’s tax bracket for both the payroll
and income taxes in order to ensure exogeneity.
In addition to the inclusion of payroll tax rates in the specification of
“The treatment of refund cases in the audit data set (or ‘negative’ evaders), of which there are
only eight income and six tax overreporters, is somewhat complicated. Overreporters of either
type are clasG&i as compliant fur the second-stage probit estimation. Thi.; approach is
motivated by, and consistent with, Clotfelter (1983). In general, it is likely that different
behavioral responses are at work on the part of individuals and auditors in the context of overversus underreporting; that is, taxpayers may choose to underreport, whereas overreporting may
be the result of job changes, tax code complexity, and the like. A similar asymmetry may be
present on the part of auditors, who likely expend greater efforts and resources to identify
noncompliance as opposed to excess compliance. The second-stage probit formally estimates and
distinguishes between refund cases and noncompliant cases; in the third stage, the factors
inlluencing noncompliance are examined. An alternative third-stage procedure could focus on
overreporters, given a second-s?age probit that selected the refund cases (as opposed to the
noncompliant cases). Of course, the second stage could also be estimated with the refund cases
excluded from the compliant cases. However, such exclusion would introduce selection bias.

MTR, a measure @i’matginaI payroll tax benefits (BENEFIT) is included as
a separate regressor. This variable measures the present o-2lue of payroll tax
benefits that accrue from payroll taxation in the present period. Its calculration is summarized in table 4. As with the marginal tax rate, marginal
payroll tax benefits are based upon true income. These benefits raise the cost
nderreporting; however, they have an ambiguous theoretical effect on
compliance due to their income effect.
-*
Lnnib~Jtir~my variables are included to reflect the accrual of different types
of income that are subject to varying degrees of source withholding and
cross-verification. The first dummy variable indicates the presence of wage
income (WAGDUM). Since wage income is provided in the PAYE sector
where evasion is more difficult, a negative WAGDUM-noncomplliance relationship is hypothesized. The presence of dividend income is represented by
DZVDUM. Since there is no source withholding of taxes on such income, a
positive relationship between noncompliance and the presence of dividend
‘income
is expected. An additional income variable pertains to those individuals engaged in their own business who may incur losses, may have Ioss
carryovers from previous years, or may have other return adjustments
relating to self-employment. These features are measured by a dummy
variable (CAPDUM) for the existence of such return characteristics. Since
self-employment affords many opportunities for evasion, a positive relationship is anticipated between CAPDUM and underreporting.
One explanatory variable is also included to control for taxpayer heterogeneity, a family-size control variable (FAMSIZE) thai is constructed from tax
credit information. Other socioeconomic variables such as age or sex are not
included because few taxpayers actually report these items and the ITD
auditors make no attempt to measure them.‘l
Identification of the empirical model is established through the nonlinearity of the selection terms themselves. Recall also that some restricted versions
of the model are estimated without selection terms. In these cases, the model
is identified by the assumption of independence of error terms. Further, the
model with no selection terms can also be identified by the use of exclusion
restrictions; that is, the first-stage eq. (5) is identified by the exclusion of aI1
true tax return variables that are included in eqs. (7) and (8), while exclusion
of the ITD resource variable from the second- and third-stage estimations
establishes identification of eqs. (7) and (8).
analysis

4.1. Estimation results
Estimation
“The

,esults for the first and second stages are reported in tabk 5

line on evaded taxes is necessari!y omitted from the second and third stages because a

National
Trust

Housing

Civil Service
F‘dmily Benefits
Scheme

Payroll tax
program

( I + r)”

[( 0.02)( 1.03)]

0

(I + rY

0.10

ali
taxpayers

otherwise

if reported
income >
$3,000 and
public sector
employee

arginal benefit function

Marginal

The only quantifiable marginal benefits consist of a ca
participant may claim in the eighth year of contributio
contribution (2 cents per dollar) plus a 3 percent bonus. Employer
contributions to the NNT are not vested with the employee. The discount
rate is I I percen .

Benefits consist of a pension to surviving dependents of public sector
offkials. Marginal benefits per dollar of wage income equal IO cents. Benefits
are taxable by law but in practice are untaxed. The benefit and discounting
periods are specified as follows: (I) taxpayer age is imputed from the
Jamaica Consumer Expenditure survey on the basis of income; (2) i=O is
the present period; (3) taxpayer life expectancy is life expectancy at birth
(lower case I represents the difference between life expectancy and imputed
age); (4) spouse age is assumed to equal that of the public sector official; (5)
spouse life expectancy determines ?; and is assumed to be the conditional
life expectancy given age; and (6) the discount rate r is II percent, an
average of the prevailing savings and prime lending rates for 1983.

Comments and discussion

payroll tax 5 ,lefit functions.

Table 4

X

Nation;11 Insurance
Scheme-Pension
Program
(Invalidity)

National insurance
Scheme- Pension
Program
( Widows-Widowers)

National Insurance
Scheme-Pension
Program
(Old age)

National Insurance
Scheme-Employment
Injury Program

0.005

ot herwisc

0

‘r_ ().()f

[LJ! +r)’

otherwise
Marginal benefits equal I cent and arc payable to lhcr~ permanently
disabled. Lower case I is assumed IO cyual 5; upper case 7’is ussumcd to
equal life expectancy minus iI@2 plus 0 Benefits arc weighaed by thr:
prl‘y’,,m. Thy
pcrcent:tpc t,)f NI!, ;ewar& ;rttr!htri.$F,l:x)<I Ih;! inilli&f\
r.Ltr 1s I I prrixnc.
~I!;COLII~~

Marginal benefits equal 0.5 cents. The specification of 7: 1. and i iii
analogous to the CSFBS. Benefits are weighted by the percentage crl I%lS
awards granled to widows and widowers in the WL?lc)NJ period lcr arrive
at a measure of expected benefits. The discount rate is I I percent.

it $C;24 <
reported
income <
$7,800

othcrwisc

if $624 c
reported
income <
s7,xtH)

0

ik,( I +r)i

f

0

Marginal payroll tax benefits from the accrual and taxalion of one dollar of
reported income equal I cent. The diflerence between the retirement age (651
and the Imputed age reflects the diflerence between when the D-E choice is
made (i --0) and when benefits begin to be received 41). The benefit receipt
period (T-r)
is assumed to equal the dilrerence between conditional lifk
expectancy given age and the retirement age. The discount rate is I f
percent.

Any disabled PAYE sector worker is entitled to benefits that equal seventy
five percent of wages. payable for one year. Each additional dollar of wage
income may generate 75 cents in future benefits. Benefits arc weighted by
the percentage of PAYE workers receiving employment injur’y awards in
1983. Single period discounting is employed.

if $624 <
reported
income e
$7,800

otherwise

0

;. ,O.Ol
,ti,( 1 +r)’

iF $1.109
< reported
income c
$7,800

0.044 cents

under two ~~te~~ative ~ss~rn~t~

and for two alternative specific

iate probit modems of
iate s~s~~lts assume t
ir~depende~t~ which i

specification.
eral, the results are consistent across estimation
ient signs and significance patterns. The jointly es
probit models both exhibit highly significant x2 statistic
probit model of audit selection and the univ ate probit models of
probability of tax and income underreporting e
nonetheiess statisticaiiy significant x2 statistics. The biv
yields a rather large and signikant estimate of RHO, the correlation
coeficient between the jointly estimated probits.z2 This positive point
estimate indicates a high correlation between unobservable factors influencit?g the probability of audit and unobservable factors influencing the
probability of noncompliance.23
The first-stage estimation results for the probability of audit are reported
in the upper part of table 5. The positive and significant estimate of RHO,
complemented by the statistical significance of the full array of explanatory
variables, provides support for the game-theoretic approach to tax COMpliance ir, w!Gch there is systematic audit seilection. Higher levels of reported
taxes (RTAX) serve to increase the probability of audit, as does the
presence of capital losses, loss carry-avers, and other capital allowances
(CAFIN.JiW).24The latter result indicates an auditing focus on those engaged
in their own trade or business.
storical experience of the ITD may have
shown
this to be a pro~tab~e
cus for auditing activities. The positive
e auditing resource variable (i’TI?RES) shows that greater
s transkHe into higher audit pro abilities, as might be
expected.
somewhat surprisingly, the reported receipt of dividend income
_COllPmOn

surcharge of 50 percent is imposed on delinquent tax liabilities.
of the model, including a constrahed version estimated wit
constant to conduct likelihood ratio tests, also yield similar point estimates of RHO.
23A similar result is
d Wilde (1988) and Dubin
“4Estimation of
~at~~~ with reported into
taxes yields simiiar
uces a statistically signific
~ariakde.Reported income and reported taxes are not included to
~lhc~~~~~~a~tybetween re carted taxes and reported income.

‘“Narrowerspecifications

2.0* IQ-

ITDRES
Constant
Second stage noncomp:iance
MTR
INC
WAGDUM
VI VDUM
CAPDUM

f)-j?*+*

(0.01)
2”69**+
-@OS,
t.79*
(0.94)
3.4* to-$*
(2.9* 1O-5]
- 0.37
(0.38)
_- 2.14***
(0.70)
0.33
(0.24)

BENEFIT
FAMSlZE
Constant
RHO

,a:;:;
- 0.08
(0.05)
- 0.04
(0.40)

ItP)

(2.0*
2.&P*+
( aas)

-

i-46”**

(0.19)
5.6*lO-5**’
(l.O* 10-t)
-0.3g***
(0.09)
- O.92***
(0.15)
O..56***
(O-06)
- 10.75***
(f-04)
- 0.03**
(O.01)
- 3.71*+*
(0.10)
0.93***
(0.03)
4J45.6

sea

(8.3* f13-eI
-0.16
(O.1t)
-0.39***
(0.(O)
O‘f3**’
(O.W
o.O4**
fO.02)
p 2.94***
(OW

3.2!0**+

f&k

9.3* tO-5*
(5.2* 10-5)
-o.f31*
(0.41)
- 1.43***
f0.50)
,L;,
5.74
(5.69)
-0.14**
(OW
- 1.O9*
(0.56)
-

I.1 1***
(0.34)
5.5 * lo- 5***
(f.O* :o-7)
-0.63***
(0.09)
- 0.99***
(0.10)
O.25**”
(O-06)
- 1.20
( 1.46)
-0.05***
(O.OI)
- 3.58***
(0.19)
0.93***
(0.02)
4,875.0

- 2 *In likelihood ratio
b
~_ __.--.___~
“Maximum likelihood coeficienl estimates are reported with asymptotic standard errors in
parentheses.
bMinus 2 times the dog-likelihood ratio is distributed 1’. The x2 statistic for the univariate
model of audit selection is 303.7. The l’ statistics for the univariate modek of income and tax
underreporting are 37.6 and 62.0, respectively.
*significant at 0.10 level.
**significant at 0.05 level.
***significant at 0.01 level.
b
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(RDIVDUM) lowers the likelihood of audit, despite the fact that secondary
income sources expand noncompliance opportunities. This result ay reflect
cross verification difficulties on the part of ITD auditors, or
dividend income primarily by honest taxpayers. As expect
receipt of wage income (RWAGDUM) also lowers audit ~~~~a~i~~ties. Since
wage income is subject to source withholding, auditors may not find it worth
their effort to focus on this income source.
The second-stage estimation results, or those pertaining to the proba
of noncompliance, are r orted in the lower part of table 5. Univariatc
probit estimates of the il lihood of noncompliance are presented for two
measures of evasion, income underreporting (INCNON) and tax underreporting (TAXNON);
bivariate probit estimates are also reported as the
second component of the joint estimation of audit selection and the
probabilify of underreporting.
The second-stage results tell a consistent story regarding the determinants
of the probability of noncompliance (ZNCNON and TAXNON). In particular, the marginai tax rate (MT@ significantly raises the probability of being
an income or tax underreporter. This result is similar to that of Clotfelter
(1983), and indicates that the highly progressive tax rates in Jamaica
encourage noncompliance by raising the rewards for successful evasion. A
higher level of taxpayer income (I&C) also has an unambiguously positive
effect on noncompliance propensities. The positive relationship between
income and underreporting may reflect both broader opportunities for
noncompliance for those with higher income and decreasing absolute risk
aversion.
The measure of payroll tax benefits (BENEFIT), which captures the
present value of future benefits derived from paying an additional dollar in
payroll taxes, lowers the probability of income underreporting, but fails to
exert a statistically significant influence on the probability of tax underreporting. This result indicates the limited role of an additional policy device
for combatting evasion that has not been previously identified. A sound
payroll tax program may induce participation in the formal sector of the
economy, and at the same time enhance the compliance of those within the
formal sector.
The results for the remaining variables are generally stable and consistent
across equations. The accrual of wage income (WAGDUM) lowers underreporting propensities, which emphasizes the merits of a source withholding
system. Somewhat surprisingly, the receipt of dividend income (DIVDUM)
also lowers the probability of underreporting. One explanation is that the
presence of serious probiems with cross verification has led ITD auditors to
largely ignore this income source. An alternative explanation is that only
hones
ch income. Capital allowances and adjustments
(CAP
ability of tax Qnderre ortinp ““is result reflects

the

unique
opportunity

for t

loyed

to

evade thr

ness activities. Finally, taxpayerswit largesfamiliesqE.4
smaller families.
Larger families may

ake compliance less attractive;
larger families may also face a higher ~~~ort~~~it cost IF ~~~~~~~e~ as
noncompliant.
Table 6 contains the thi
ssions for the levels of
underreported
income a
RPPIC and
UNDERTAX). A total of six sets of regression results are reported,
corresponding to the two alternative measl;res of the dependent variable and
three alternative estimation techniques. In general, the third-stage results are
consistent with the second-stage results in that those factors that influence
underreporting probabilities tend to have a similar impact on the levels of
noncompliance.
Results for the most general specification are reported in the first two
columns of table 6. These results use the bivariate probit model to generate
two sample selection terms, ic, and RN,corresponding to the first stage (audit
probability) and the second stage (noncompliance probability), respectively.
Note that while the signs of all variable coeflkients are consistent with the
signs of those in the second stage, as well as with the other estimates of table
6, the extraordinarily large standard errors yield statistical insignificance for
all variables, including the sample selection terms.
There is strong evidence that this pattern of results is attributable to a
serious multicollinearity problem introduced by the two selectivity terms. As
noted by Behrman and Wolfe (1984) and Tunali (1986), such collinearity can
be expected by the very nature of the construction of the two selectivity bias
controls. This is evident from eq. (9), where the individual components of the
selection bias controls are detailed.
There are a number of othe: indicators of 2 nulticolIinearity problem.
First, the two selection bias controls exhibit an extremely high pairwise
correlation coefficient of -0.83. Second, note the dramatic increase in
standard errors in columns one and two of table 6, relative to the alternative
specifications of the third stage. While the point estimates are reasonably
stable, the standard errors sometimes increase by more than thirty-fold, as
with BENEFIT. Third, the adjusted R-square does not diminish when the
two selection terms are omitted; in fact, the explanatory power of the
underreported tax equation actually increases, indicating that more is lost
through degrees of freedom than is gained through additional explanatory
power when the selection terms are included. Finally, F-tests for the linear
regressions in columns one and twa allow rejection of the nul
that the set of regressors has no impact on noncompliance, des
that no individual parameters are statis
as the
el is most ge
ecificztion of the

F

(0.46)
7.37
(6.23)
0.33
6.36

0.1 I

(1.15)

with corrected

- 0.28
(3.06)
0.72
(1.14)
0.02
(5.5)
-8.81
(168.2 ’
-2.5* lo-”
(6.3 * lo- ‘)
- 0.04
0.2)
- 0.08
(0.W
5.51
(6.01)
0.50
13.14

“Coelkient~ estimates are reported
*Signilicant at 0.10 level.
**Significant at 0.05 level.
***Significant at 0.01 level.
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1.23
(1.85)
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Biia&te

standard

5.30***
(0.62)
0.51
17.16
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-

- 10.05f’
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(4.4* IO -)
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UNDERTAX
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errors in parentheses.
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(0.39)
0.33
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-
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0.04
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- 1.44
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(l.S* 10-q

(kg

WNDERINC

Bivariate selection
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_

_____.

_ _~___ ~~ --

6.53

0.33

6.26***
(1.53)

2.12
(1.55)

~-0.09
(0.06)

- 0.03
(P.67)

- 19.35***
(6.13)

0.33
(0.33)

- 3.59**
( 1.67)

- 1.33***
(0.34)

5.6 it IO- 5*+
(2.0* 10-q

UNDERINC
___. ~~~~__~--.-__
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3.22*
( 1.90)

0.52
13.9

f 1.34)

1.25
(1.13)
4.29*“”

0.04
(0.19)
- 8.54’
(4.75)
- 0.06
(0.06)
- 0.09

( 1.03)

- 0.73*
(0.40)
- 0.47

.-

1.1* 10-4***
(2.3 * lo- 5,

ONDERTAX
_ ~__.
___.
4.61 k*
(2.15)

Independent univariate
selection terms included

Double selection estimates of the level of income and tax underreporting.

Table 6

The levels of underrepor
higher levels of income.

other explanatory

more compliant. While family size may influence the probability of underreporting, family size exerts no influence on the level of noncompliance once
one is an underreporter. Capital allowances tend to rake evasion prc-babihties in the second stage, but as with family size have no impact on the level
of underreporting. Finally. the receipt of wage income tends to lower the
level of income underreporting, providing additional support for source
withholding.
Another set of estimation results is reported in the last two columns of
table 6. These specifications remain quite general in that both selection
hurdles are explicitly controlled for; however, the selectivity terms are now
generated from univariate probit estimates of the probability of audit and the
probability of noncompliance, so that independence is assumed across the
-,robit equations. Vote that neither of these selection terms is statistically
significant, which means that the null hypothesis of no selection bias cannot
be rejected at conventional significance levels2’
As with other specifications of the third-stage model, marginal tax rates
and income tend to raise the levels of underreporting, while larger payroll
tax benefits lower the levels of underreporting. Family size and capital
allowances still exert an influence only on the probability of noncompliance,
and wage income reduces the level of underreporting.
Together. the second- and third-stage results
that tax incentives are a key consideration in m
general, higher tax rates and higher income increase nonco
‘“This red? does not necessarily implv -i random au it strategy. since a number of factors
to be statistically related to the probability of udit in the first stage. The absence of
selection bias simply implies the independence of error terms across equations.
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uhile higher payroll tax benefits decrease noncompliance. These results are
found for both the probability and the level of noncompliance.“h*27
4.2. The implications of poiicy reform
These estimation results provide the basis for the analysis of policy reform.
Two sets of simulation results are presented. The first set examines the
underreporting implications of ‘minor reform’ by calculating the response of
I.mderreporting to a one percent change in the various policy parameters
(e.g., income, the marginal tax rate, and the margitral payroll benefit rate).
The second set pertains to the underreporting implications of a ‘major
reform’ implemented recently in Jamaica.
In both sets of simulations, the analysis is confined to those audited (the
148 observations in the audit data set) because it is only this group for which
there is any information on ‘true’ return items and because these ‘true’ return
items are necessary to use the results of the second- and third-stage
estimations; for those not audited, ‘true’ return items are not available.28 In
addition, the analysis uses underreported income equations, as opposed to
underreported tax equations, because underreported taxes depend upon
underreported income as well as the tax structure.29 Finally, the behavioral
responses are simulated both for the third-stage model with the selectivity
lhTobit maximum likelihood estim:..lon results for the combined second and third stages with
and without the selectivity conrro: i.* from the first-stage (univariate) probit estimation yield
similar results. For income noncompliance, see table Appendix A, where the dependent variable
now includes those individuals with zero and positive noncompliance and corrected asymptotic
standard errors are in parentheses. With some exceptions, most variables are significant at the
0.10 level or better. Similar results are found for Tobit estimation of tax noncompliance. Note
that heteroscedasticity
may be present in the Tobit estimation, although Arabmazar and
Schmidt (1981) show that its presence need not lead to biased estimates. Note also that the
inclusion of the selection term (AA) implies nonnormality of the regression disturbance.
2’Estimates of the seco d and third stages that include the predicted probability from the
first-stage (univariare) probit model give similar results. For income underreporting (INCNON
and UNDERINC), SW table Appendix B, where AUDPROB is the predicted probability of audit
selection from the first-stage univariate probit model, &, is the selection control from the
second-stage probit estimation, and corrected asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. The
results are largely unaffected by the use of tax underreporting (TAXNON and UNDERTAX) as
the dependent variables. Note the negative and significant coefficients on AUDPROB, so that an
increase in the probability of detection increases cop@iance. Note also that Tobit estimation
could be applied here.
‘“The behavioral responses have also been confined to those audited individuals identified as
noncompliant. The bthavioral responses for this group are similar to (although siightly larger
than) those for all crudited irdividuals.
29Tw~ examples illtistrate this point. First, an individual earning J98.000 in true income may
have been identified as a tax underreporter prior to the reform; however, after the reform, ‘his
individual will be exempt from taxation and could no longer be @wed as noncompliant.
Second. when tax rates change. it would be impqssible to distinguish between the tax structure
changes and behavioral response from the reform. Both issues can be addressed using the
underreported income equation.

terms omitted ~cohmn three of table 6) and for the third-stage model with
independent selectivity terms (column five of table 6). This approach in
followed because these two sets of results place upper and lower bounds on
the point estimates of IMC, MTR, and BENEF’I7:
The simulations are conducted by evaluating the diflerence between
predicted underreported income in the pre- and post-reform tax regimes.33
There are three steps involved in each simulation. The first step requires
calculation of the pre-reform expected value of underreported income for
each individual in the audit data set, using the pre-reform values for the
explanatory variables. 31 For the underreporting equation with no selectivity
terms, this calculation is a straightforward application of the estimated
coeff!cients to the appropriate ‘true’ return characteristics for each individual
return; for the equation with two selectivity terms, the calculation also
requires evaluation of the relevant sample selectivity term (or the inverse
MilO’sratio) for each stage of selection. In the second step, the post-reform
value of underreported income is calculated for each individual when the
appropriate policy instrument is altered. Again, this is a straightforvrdrd
calculation for the model with no selectivity terms, in which each return
characteristic (including those items subject to policy changes) is multiplied
by its corresponding coefficient estimate. When the selectivity terms are
included, the calculation reflects the fact that the inverse Mill’s ratio from the
second-stage probability of noncompliance equation is affected by the policy
changes. For practical reasons the inverse Mill’s ratio from the first-stage
probability of audit estimation is assumed invariant to the policy changes,
since the first stage is estimated with reported return items under a given
audit strategy and it is not clear how reporting and auditing will change in
response to policy. In the third step, the difference between the predicted
levels of underreporting in the pre- and post-reform regimes is taker, ts
represent the simulated behavioral response to reform.
Consider first the responses of underreporting to ‘minor reform’, or one
percent changes in INC, M TR, and BENEFIT. The average underreportingincome elasticity ranges from 0.49 to 0.61 for all taxpayers, with the larger
elasticity coming from the model with independent selection terms. The
smallest elasticity by tax bracket (see table 1 for the brackets) is for those in
the lowest tax bracket (0.01 to 0.1 I), and the elasticities increase monotonically with income, reaching highs of 0.73 to 0.87 for those in the top tax
bracket.
30Although actual underreporting
throughout the analysis for the sake
3’For example the expected value
found to be cornpliant is calculated
individuals
audited and found to
expectations are computed using the

is observed for the noncompliant.
predicted values :dre used
of consistency.
of underreported
income for those individuals audited and
as A(E 1f z > 0, I*, 50). while the expected value for those
be noncompliant
is given as R(E 11; >O. It >O). These
estimation results from eqs. (5). (7), (8) and (9).
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The overall marginal tax rate elasticity ranges from 0.56 to 1.18. Again the
elasticities Increase for higher tax brackets. In the top bracket, where the presimulation marginal tax rate (inclusive of income and payroll taxes) sometimes exceeds 60 percent, the elasticity reaches 1.37, for the third-stage model
with independent selection trms. These large elasticities illustrate both the
importance of tax incentives in the compliance decision and the differential
effects of taxes on individuals with different incomes.
small, amounting
The underreporting-benefits elasticities are all extrem
wever, unlike the
on average to only -0.19 to - 0.20 for all taxpayers.
effects arising from income and marginal tax rater), the
ponses decline as
the tax bracket increases, reflecting the limitation of benefits above certain
income ceilings in the Jamaican payroll programs. Payroll tax benefit
programs can apparently have their largest impact on the compliance
patterns of low income individuals.
In general, these results point to systematic behavioral responses on the
part of individuals, and indicate the important role fiscal structure can play
in influencing compliance. In particular, the responses to higher marginal tax
rates adds credence t2 popular arguments that they are a key incentive for
noncompliance, despite theoretical arguments to the contrary. The results
also reveal differential responses to various policy instruments across tax
brackets, which may introduce uneven equity effects and may complicate the
design of programs to combat noncompliance.
Also of interest are the responses to major reform. The Government of
Jamaica has recently enacted a comprehensive reform of the individual
income tax. Alhough there were many justifications for the reform, foremost
was the belief that the pre-existing tax regime stifled incentives and encouraged both tax avoidance and tax evasion at a rather grand scale. The reform
replaces the highly progressive rate structure with a flat marginal tax rate of
33 3 percent applied to all income in excess of J$8,580; income less than
JS8,580 is tax-exempt. Further, all tax credits have been abolished, and most
employer provided perquisites have been brought into the tax base. In total,
the reform is estimated to reduce income tax liabilities by J$60 million in
1986, SO that it is not a revenue-neutral reform. In simulating the response to
major reform, the income and substitution effects attributable to the change
in effective marginal tax rates are examined separately from the change in net
of tax income. The change in the effective marginal tax rate encompasses
nominal rate changes, as well as changes in credits; the change in income
capf=s the influence of a!? aspects of the reform, including rate changes, the
abolition of tax credits, and the imposition of the exemption level. As with
minor tax reform, behavioral responses are simulated using the third-stage
model with selectivity terms omitted and the third-stage model with independent selectivity terms.
ue to the magnitude of the changes introduced by the reform, the

simulated behavioral responses are quite large. The response to reduced
effective marginal tax rates causes underreporting to decline by 21.2 to 43.0
percent, with the largest effects in the top brackets where rate reductions are
more pronounced.
The simulated response to the change in net income has the opposite effect
on compliance due to the positive underreporting-income elasticity. Underreporting here is estimated to increase by 20.9 to 35. percent, which is
clearly an unintended aspect of the reform. The overall income response is
dominated by those in the top tax bracket where the increase in net income
arising from reform is most pronounced. For this group of individuals,
underreporting is estimated to increase by 37.4 to 55.1 percent.
The net effect of major reform is a modest reduction in svcraill underreporting ranging from -0.3 percent to -7.4 percent. For those in the top
tax bracket, an increase in underreporting of approximately 14 percent is
projected; for all other tax brackets, the net effect is to reduce underreporting. These are important results, and suggest that auditing resources should
be directed to higher income individuals. It is important to note, however,
that the simulations ignore the likelihood that other taxes wiil be increased
or that public services will be reduced in order to reduce any reform-induced
deficit. To the extent that net income falls from other policy changes, the
income responses reported here are overstated.
Clearly, the reform will not solve all of Jamaica’s noncompliance problems.
Opportunities and incentives for noncompliance will remain for the selfemployed, particularly those in higher income classes. In addition, it must be
remembered that underreporting is only part of the compliance problem in
Jamaica. Nonfiling of tax returns appears to be a more severe probrcm, and
the response of nonfilers to the reform is not known. Tax reform must
necessarily be accompanied by a vigorous enforcement campaign to induce
further taxpayer compliance with the income and payroll taxes.
5. Conclusions
It is a,,parent that the tax compliance game is a complicated one, in which
both taxpayer and tax agency interact strategicaiiy to achieve their respective
ends. This paper provides empirical evidence from Jamaica to support this
view of compliance. The estimation results provide strong evidence that the
tax agency systematically uses information reported b:J the taxpayer to select
returns for audit. Consequently, it should not be assumed that the behavior
of the agency is given and exogenous to the compliance process, nor can it
be assumed that the behavior of the taxpayer has no effect on the probability
--*not
that economic factors
of audit. The estimation results aiso sugSLJ
ecision,
after c~~tro~~~ng fo
large role in the individual’s evasion
selection. Underreporting is positively related to the marginal tax rate and to
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income, and is negatively affected by the benefits of payroll programs.
pportunitics for evasion, as measured by sources of income, also ;I
evasion. These results indicate that the government can have a substantial
effect on compliance through its fiscal structure. For example, it is estimated
that the recent reform of the Jamaican income tax will actually decrease
compliance among the self-employed by as much as 9.1 percent, due
primarily to the large increases in net income resulting from the reform. It is,
of course, possible to devise other policies that will increase reported income
More generahy, this paper shows that understanding tax compliance - and
devising policies to combat it - requires recognition of the strategic nature of
the compliance game.
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Appendix A
Table A.1

variable
MTR

Dependent variable: Underreported
income
Iii0
( 5.07)

INC
WAGDWM
DIVDUM
CAPDUM
BENEFIT
FA MSfZE

Constant

1.2* 1o-4
(9.2* lo-5)
- 8.48
(2.21)
- 20.22
(4.97)
2.43
( 1.42)
- 130.60
(29.52)
-0.01
(0.33)
- 18.10
(3.10)

9.36
(3.23)
1.5 * 1o-4
(8.6* 10-5)
- 4.96
(2.02)
- 14.97
(4.46)
4.48
( 1.62)

- 30.09
( 17.60)
- 0.25
(0.17)
14.78
(7.50)
- 39.60
( 15.74)
~_ ~~ ~~_

Appendix B
Table B.1
Qependent
Independent
variable
MTR
INC

WAGDUM
DI VDCJM
CAPDUM
BENEFIT
FA MSIZE
AUDPROB

!(L~CNON

4.01
(l.‘r9)
0.56
(0.32)
-0.50
(0.40)
-3.12
(0.78)
0.44
(0.26)
- 6.28
(4.91)
-0.18
(0.07)
- 1.70
(0.44)

/-N

Constant

variable

0.4 1
(0.43)

2 57
( 1:27)
0.44
(0.19)
- I.00
(0.28)
- 1.77
(0.81)
0.11
(0.22)
-1363
(3.46)
-005
(O.C$
- 1.02
(0.35)
0. I 8
(0.5t)
8.04
t&65)
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